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The	Economic	Origins	of	the	Postwar	Southern	Elite	
Bradon	Dupont		Western	Washington	University	
Joshua	L.	Rosenbloom	Iowa	State	University	National	Bureau	of	Economic	Research		The	U.S.	Civil	War	destroyed	a	substantial	fraction	of	southern	wealth	and	emancipation	transferred	human	capital	to	the	formerly	enslaved.		The	prevailing	view	of	most	economic	historians	is	that	the	southern	planter	elite	was	able	to	retain	its	relative	status	despite	these	shocks.		Previous	studies	have	been	hampered,	however,	by	limits	on	the	ability	to	link	individuals	between	census	years,	and	scholars	have	been	forced	to	focus	on	persistence	within	one	or	a	few	counties.		Recent	advances	in	electronic	access	to	the	Federal	Census	manuscripts	now	make	it	possible	to	link	individuals	without	these	constraints.		In	this	paper,	we	exploit	the	ability	to	search	the	full	manuscript	census	to	construct	a	sample	that	links	top	wealth	holders	in	1870	to	their	1860	census	records.		Although	there	was	an	entrenched	southern	planter	elite	that	retained	their	economic	status,	we	find	evidence	that	the	turmoil	of	the	1860s	opened	greater	opportunities	for	mobility	in	the	South	than	was	the	case	in	the	North,	resulting	in	much	greater	turnover	among	wealthy	southerners	than	among	comparably	wealthy	northerners.			Keywords:	Civil	War;	Wealth	Inequality	JEL	Codes:	N3,	N31,	N4		 	
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1.		Introduction	The	Civil	War	and	emancipation	represent	major	turning	points	in	the	history	of	the	United	States.		For	scholars	seeking	to	understand	the	consequences	of	the	war,	a	central	question	has	been	whether	the	southern	economic	elite	was	able	to	retain	its	status	and	economic	influence	after	the	war,	or	was	displaced	by	wartime	destruction	and	the	end	of	slavery.		This	question	is	crucial	for	understanding	the	trajectory	of	postwar	economic	development	in	the	south	since	a	persistent	group	of	high	wealth	individuals	may	have	had	sufficient	political	power	to	shape	the	contours	of	economic	development	in	that	region	well	into	the	20th	century.		We	know	from	a	growing	body	of	literature	that	significant	wealth	inequality	can	lead	to	slower	economic	growth	largely	because	of	the	institutional	arrangements	that	are	controlled	by	those	at	the	very	top	of	the	wealth	distribution	(Engerman	and	Sokoloff	1997,	2002;	Acemoglu	2008).		Before	we	can	understand	the	extent	to	which	this	may	have	occurred	in	the	postwar	South,	we	must	explore	the	dynamics	of	mobility	during	the	1860s.	Elite	persistence	is	particularly	relevant	for	the	American	south	in	light	of	Ager’s	(2013)	finding	that	counties	with	the	wealthiest	planters	before	the	Civil	War	performed	significantly	worse	as	late	as	the	mid-twentieth	century,	mostly	because	the	planter	elite	opposed	investments	in	mass	education	in	those	counties.1	Using	land	prices	as	a	measure	of	agricultural	profits,	Ager	examines	whether	the	planter	elite																																																									1	The	theoretical	work	of	Galor	and	Zeira	(1993)	also	shows	how	human	capital	investments	can	act	as	a	channel	by	which	wealth	inequality	translate	into	lower	levels	of	economic	development	over	the	long	run.	
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were	able	to	defend	their	agricultural	interests	through	the	exercise	of	political	power	during	Reconstruction.		He	finds	that	land	prices	after	the	war	were	in	fact	higher	in	counties	with	a	wealthier	class	of	planters.		In	his	view,	“the	planter	elite’s	de	facto	power	allowed	them	to	capture	local	institutions	for	their	own	interest	until	the	new	constitutions	restored	some	of	their	de	jure	power”	(4).	Wallenstein	(1976)	similarly	found	that	wealthy	planters	in	Georgia	dominated	public	finance	throughout	the	Reconstruction	period	with	detrimental	effects	on	economic	development	in	that	state.	These	results	are	broadly	consistent	with	the	political	economy	model	of	Alesina	and	Rodrik	(1994),	who	argued	that	persistent	inequality	leads	to	the	adoption	of	growth-retarding	policies.	They	are	also	consistent	with	Engerman	and	Solkoloff’s	(2000,	p.	221)	claim	that	wealth	inequality	“contributed	to	the	evolution	of	institutions	that	protected	the	privileges	of	the	elites	and	restricted	opportunities	for	the	broad	mass	of	the	population	to	participate	fully	in	the	commercial	economy	even	after	the	abolition	of	slavery”	in	the	New	World.		If	it	is	the	case,	as	Acemoglu	and	Robinson	(2006,	p.	326)	claimed,	that	“Southern	elites	still	possessed	considerable	de	factor	power	through	their	control	over	economic	resources,”	then	focusing	on	the	wealthiest	households	and	the	extent	to	which	they	maintained	their	position	in	the	wealth	distribution	can	shed	light	on	the	extent	to	which	the	long-term	trajectory	of	the	southern	economy	was	determined	by	socioeconomic	persistence	within	that	group.	Some	early	scholarship	concluded	that	since	the	plantation	system	disappeared	after	1867,	the	war	must	have	uprooted	the	Southern	planter	elite.		This	idea	seems	to	have	originated	in	an	1881	article	by	Henry	W.	Grady,	which	was	later	cited	by	Hammond	(1897)	in	his	well-known	history	of	the	cotton	industry,	and	persisted	well	
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into	the	twentieth	century.	Buck	(1937,	p.	145),	for	example,	concludes	that	“The	small,	rich	landowning	aristocracy	in	whose	interest	so	much	of	Southern	energy	had	been	expended	was	deprived	of	its	privileged	position.”	By	this	time,	however,	other	scholars	had	begun	to	challenge	the	view	that	the	war	had	displaced	the	antebellum	elite.		Shugg	(1937),	for	example,	concluded	from	an	examination	of	Louisiana	tax	records,	that	the	plantation	system	was	not	destroyed	by	the	war	and	that	land	ownership	actually	became	more	concentrated	after	the	war.	2		The	most	influential	modern	works	on	the	subject	are	Jonathan	Wiener’s	(1976,	1979)	studies	using	census	data	for	five	Alabama	counties.			Using	the	manuscript	census	to	trace	the	fortunes	of	the	planter	elite,	Wiener	found	that	43	percent	of	the	236	largest	landholders	in	the	Alabama	black	belt	in	1860	remained	among	the	planter	elite	in	1870.		Noting	that	this	rate	of	persistence	rate	was	quite	close	to	the	47	percent	that	prevailed	from	1850	to	1860	period,	Wiener	concluded	that	the	evidence	supported	Shugg’s	view	that	the	wealthy	planter	elite	held	a	greater	share	of	real	estate	value	in	those	counties	after	the	war	than	it	had	before.		Ransom	and	Sutch	(1977)	concurred,	arguing	that	landownership	was	quite	stable	even	though	the	number	of	farms	in	the	five	cotton	states	increased	by	52	percent	between	1860	and	1870,	and	that	the	percent	of	improved	land	over	100	acres	fell	from	81	percent	in	1860	to	60	percent	in	1870.3		In	a	parallel	study	using	data	from	one	Texas	county,																																																									2	Interestingly,	Woodward	(1951)	cited	Shugg’s	observation	that	northern	corporations	purchased	Louisiana	sugar	plantations	in	support	of	his	argument	that	there	was	a	revolution	in	land	ownership	after	the	war.		However,	as	Wiener	(1976)	pointed	out,	Shugg	also	argued	that	there	was	no	such	change	in	ownership	for	the	cotton	plantations.		According	to	Shugg	(1968,	p.	246),	the	available	evidence	on	cotton	plantations	“argues	against	any	sudden	or	sweeping	overturn	in	ownership.”	3	See	Ransom	and	Sutch	(1977),	Table	4.5,	p.	71.	
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Campbell	(1982)	analyzed	population	persistence	over	the	1850	to	1880	period	and	concluded	that	the	rate	of	geographical	persistence	was	fairly	high	among	planters	of	all	sizes:	43	percent	of	large	planters	persisted	between	1860	and	1870,	while	poor	whites	were	the	least	persistent	(only	a	22	percent	persistence	rate).		He	also	found	that	while	the	planter	elite	suffered	considerable	economic	losses	during	the	Civil	War	decade,	they	actually	improved	their	relative	position	between	1860	and	1880.	Ransom	(1989,	p.	234)	similarly	concluded	that	even	though	the	large	farms	were	broken	up	into	smaller	units,	“land	ownership	in	the	South	remained	in	the	hands	of	those	who	had	owned	land	and	slaves	before	the	war.”	While	these	earlier	studies	have	been	enlightening,	they	have	also	been	limited	by	a	restricted	geographic	scope.		On	the	one	hand,	this	has	meant	assuming	that	results	for	one	or	a	few	counties	can	be	safely	generalized	to	apply	to	the	region	as	a	whole.		On	the	other	hand,	given	high	rates	of	geographic	mobility	in	the	nineteenth	century,	it	has	not	been	possible	to	establish	whether	individuals	who	moved	out	of	the	area	under	study	moved	up	or	down	the	wealth	distribution,	leaving	open	the	possibility	that	any	conclusions	may	reflect	the	vagaries	of	sample	selection.4		As	Massey	(2016,	p.	5)	explained,	matching	individuals	within	restricted	geographic	areas	“poses	a	serious	threat	to	the	representativeness	of	the	matched	sample.”		Recent	advances	in	electronic	finding	aids	for	historical	censuses	combined	with	online	access	to	complete	census	manuscripts	for	the	entire	country,	both	available	through	the	Ancestry.com	website,	allow	us	to	improve	on	these	earlier																																																									4	According	to	Oakes	(1982,	p.	77),	“nearly	sixty	percent	of	the	1850	slaveholders	[in	Jasper	County,	Georgia]	were	gone	ten	years	later.”		Schaefer	(1985)	found	similarly	high	rates	of	geographic	mobility	among	slave	owners	between	1850	and	1860.	
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studies	by	examining	the	wealth	persistence	across	the	1860s	for	a	nationwide	sample	of	individuals	linked	between	1860	and	1870	despite	potential	geographic	mobility.		In	this	article,	we	analyze	the	origins	of	a	sample	of	the	wealthiest	household	heads	in	1870	in	both	the	South	and	the	North.5	We	find	that	while	over	40	percent	of	wealthy	northerners	(the	top	five	percent	of	wealth	holders)	in	1870	were	similarly	located	in	the	1860	wealth	distribution,	this	was	true	for	less	than	28	percent	of	southerners.		While	high	levels	of	wealth	provided	a	considerable	cushion	against	the	shocks	of	the	Civil	War	decade,	the	1860s	were	nonetheless	characterized	by	a	much	higher	degree	of	turnover	among	wealthy	southerners	than	among	comparably	wealthy	northerners.		We	find,	for	example,	that	40	percent	of	southerners	with	moderate	wealth	in	1860	–	between	the	55th	and	90th	percentiles	–	moved	to	the	top	of	the	wealth	distribution	by	1870,	while	less	than	one	quarter	of	the	richest	northerners	did	so.	Conventional	accounts	are	not	wrong	to	emphasize	the	persistence	of	many	wealthy	southerners,	but	there	is	considerable	evidence	that	the	turmoil	of	the	Civil	War	and	emancipation	opened	greater	opportunities	for	upward	(and	downward)	mobility	in	the	South	than	was	the	case	in	the	North.	Before	turning	to	a	description	and	analysis	of	the	linked	data,	we	begin	with	a	brief	introduction	to	the	wealth	data	available	in	the	Censuses	of	1860	and	1870	and	use	these	data	to	characterize	the	effects	of	the	Civil	War	and	emancipation	on	regional	wealth	holding.			Section	3	describes	our	procedure	for	creating	a	linked	sample	beginning	with	high	wealth	individuals	in	1870	and	locating	them	in	the	1860	census,	
																																																								5	Because	of	the	small	numbers	of	individuals	in	the	Mountain	and	Pacific	Census	Divisions	we	exclude	them	from	our	analysis.	
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and	section	4	describes	what	these	linked	data	reveal.			We	conclude	with	some	additional	interpretation	of	these	results.			
2.		The	Impact	of	the	Civil	War	on	Wealth	Levels	and	Distribution		 Both	the	1860	and	1870	population	censuses	included	questions	about	real	and	personal	property	ownership.	Along	with	the	1850	census,	which	collected	data	on	real	property	ownership,	they	constitute	the	only	nationally	representative	data	on	personal	wealth	levels	prior	to	the	late-20th	century.		Wealth	levels	in	both	census	years	were	self-reported,	but	a	number	of	studies	have	confirmed	their	reliability.		Soltow	(1975,	p.	6)	found	that	reported	wealth	levels	in	the	1850	to	1870	censuses	were	“generally	in	line	with	estimates	made	by	various	authorities	on	wealth	distribution.		Growth	rates	are	similar	to	those	found	for	GNP	per	worker	by	Kuznets	and	commodity	output	per	worker	by	Gallman.”		Steckel	(1990)	pointed	out	that	real	estate	holdings	cannot	be	easily	concealed	and	were	probably	reliably	reported.		Even	if	respondents	could	have	concealed	their	wealth,	Querubin	and	Snyder	(2011,	p.	65)	argued	that	they	had	no	real	incentives	to	do	so	because	“even	if	some	respondents	were	worried	that	the	information	provided	would	not	in	fact	be	confidential,	there	was	no	clear	incentive	for	under-reporting	or	over-reporting	wealth.		There	was	no	federal	tax	on	wealth	at	the	time,	and	no	estate	tax.	Personal	vanity,	however,	might	have	lead	to	some	over-reporting.”	Steckel	(1994)	showed	that	discrepancies	between	local	tax	records	and	self-reported	census	wealth	levels	in	Ohio	and	Massachusetts	were	not	systematically	related	to	other	socioeconomic	indicators	for	the	period	between	1820	and	1910.		A	number	of	other	studies	similarly	demonstrate	a	close	
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correspondence	between	the	1870	census	wealth	data	and	various	local	tax	assessments	(Galenson	and	Pope	1992,	Blocker	1994,	and	Bleakley	and	Ferrie	2016).		Galenson	and	Pope	(1992,	p.	227)	concluded	that	“the	wealth	figures	in	the	census	manuscripts	appear	to	be	reasonably	accurate	estimates	of	household	wealth,	even	though	they	may	not	typically	have	been	based	on	detailed	calculations	of	household	wealth.”	Bleakley	and	Ferrie	(2016,	p.	1483)	concluded	that	“despite	the	supposed	shortcomings	of	the	1870	census	data,	its	striking	correspondence	to	wealth	reported	by	tax	assessors	was	evident.”	Despite	the	overall	consistency	of	self-reported	census	wealth	and	other	more	objective	measures	of	property	ownership,	there	could	be	regional	differences	in	responses	that	would	bias	our	comparisons.		With	the	exception	of	the	Bleakley	and	Ferrie	(2016)	article,	studies	comparing	tax	rolls	and	census	data	have	focused	on	non-southern	regions,	so	it	is	possible	that	southerners	were	more	reluctant	to	reveal	information	about	wealth	holding	to	Federal	Census	enumerators.		We	cannot	conclusively	rule	out	this	possibility,	but	the	data	themselves	suggest	this	was	not	the	case.			One	reasonable	internal	consistency	check	is	the	fraction	of	household	heads	in	each	region	who	reported	owning	real	estate	that	gave	a	zero	value	or	did	not	answer	the	question	on	personal	property	ownership.		Since	real	estate	holdings	were	readily	observed	and	reasonably	well	documented	it	seems	less	likely	that	people	would	attempt	to	conceal	their	real	estate	holdings.			While	close	to	40	percent	of	census	respondents	reported	zero	personal	property,	only	about	10.7	percent	of	those	with	non-zero	real	property	holdings	reported	no	personal	property.	Splitting	the	sample	by	region,	among	those	with	non-zero	real	estate	wealth,	only	8.7	percent	of	
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southerners	reported	zero	personal	property	wealth,	compared	to	11.4	percent	of	northerners.6		Census	officials	at	the	time	and	some	later	scholars	have	expressed	concern	about	the	quality	of	the	1870	census	enumeration,	arguing	that	there	was	a	significant	under	count	in	this	year.		The	war	and	reconstruction	created	some	special	challenges	for	enumerators	in	the	South,	particularly	in	counting	low	income	black	Southerners,	which	apparently	distorted	the	count	to	a	greater	degree	than	in	other	census	years.		Steckel	(1991)	argued	that	the	small	increase	of	the	black	population	in	the	1860s	followed	by	a	large	increase	in	the	1870s	is	evidence	of	a	significant	undercount	for	the	black	population.	More	recent	analysis,	however,	suggests	that	the	1870	undercount	may	not	be	as	significant	as	previously	believed.	7			According	to	Hacker	et	al	(1999,	p.129),	“the	undercount	estimate	given	in	the	1890	census	report	was	greatly	exaggerated	as	a	result	of	a	failure	to	account	for	the	magnitude	of	the	negative	demographic	shock	caused	by	the	Civil	War.”	Fully	incorporating	the	slow	population	growth	of	the	1860s	relative	to	the	1870s	yields	an	undercount	of	about	6.6	percent,	not	significantly	different	from	nonresponse	rates	in	modern	survey	data	and	not	much	higher	than	the	1850	census	(Hacker,	2013).8	On	this	basis	Hacker	et	al,	argued																																																									6	The	value	of	personal	property	reported	by	the	southern	real	property	owners	was	lower	(averaging	$1,250)	than	it	was	for	northerners	($1,889),	but	this	is	not	surprising	given	the	large	share	of	southern	wealth	accounted	for	by	slaves	prior	to	the	Civil	War.	7	This	concern	originates	with	the	Director	of	the	1870	Census,	Francis	Walker,	who	believed	that	there	had	been	a	significant	undercount	of	the	population.		As	a	result	of	these	concerns,	President	Grant	ordered	a	recount	in	Philadelphia,	New	York,	and	Indianapolis.		These	concerns	were	reiterated	in	the	1890	census	and	have	been	accepted	by	many	subsequent	historians.	8	Ransom	and	Sutch	(1975)	estimated	that	the	black	undercount	was	about	6.6	percent.	
	 10	
that	the	“under	enumeration	of	southern	whites	and	blacks	in	1870	was	far	lower	than	1890	investigators	estimated,”	and	concluded	that		“[The	1870	census]	will	not	pose	a	significant	problem	for	most	analyses.”	Whatever	undercount	issues	exist	with	the	1870	census	are,	in	any	case,	likely	to	be	less	relevant	for	the	present	study,	since	we	focus	on	the	overwhelmingly	white	top	wealth	holders	whereas	the	undercount	was	most	significant	for	poorer	and	younger	blacks	in	the	South.	Tables	1	and	2	summarize	property	ownership	patterns	by	region	in	1860	and	1870,	respectively,	based	on	data	available	in	the	Integrated	Public	Use	Microdata	Series	(IPUMS)	1-in-100	random	sample	of	the	Census	(Ruggles	2015).9		Because	there	are	only	a	small	number	of	observations	from	the	Mountain	and	Pacific	Census	divisions	we	have	dropped	these	regions	from	our	analysis.		We	further	restrict	our	sample	to	household	heads.		Since	more	than	90	percent	of	property	ownership	reported	in	the	two	censuses	was	attributed	to	household	heads,	inclusion	of	non-heads	would	simply	increase	the	apparent	inequity	of	the	distribution	without	yielding	additional	insight.		In	the	tables,	we	report	a	number	of	statistics	characterizing	property	ownership	by	within-region	percentile	rankings	based	on	total	property	wealth.		The	first	five	rows	of	each	table	report	the	following	values	for	each	group:		the	number	of	observations	in	the	IPUMS;	median	values	for	real	property,	personal	property,	and	total	property	wealth;	and	the	average	share	of	real	property	in	total	wealth.		The	remaining	rows	report	a	number	of	demographic	and	occupational	characteristics.	The	first	column	for	each	region	shows	characteristics	of	the	bottom	55	
																																																								9	The	North	includes	states	in	the	Northeast	and	North	Central	Census	division,	while	the	South	includes	states	in	the	South	Atlantic	and	South	Central	Census	divisions.	
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percent	of	wealth	holders.		We	selected	this	cut-off	because	the	bottom	55	percent	of	household	heads	reported	no	real	or	personal	property	ownership	in	1870.		The	subsequent	columns	show	characteristics	for	higher	wealth	groups.		The	1860	data	illustrate	in	striking	detail	the	enormous	fortunes	that	the	slave	system	permitted	the	wealthiest	southerners	to	accumulate.		The	median	wealth	reported	by	those	in	the	top	1	percent	of	the	southern	wealth	distribution	in	1860	was	a	staggering	$122,250,	more	than	three	times	the	median	wealth	of	the	top	1	percent	of	northerners.10			Indeed,	the	median	wealth	of	the	richest	northerners	was	comparable	to	the	median	for	those	between	the	95th	and	99th	percentiles	in	the	South.		In	an	economy	that	was	still	predominantly	rural	and	agricultural,	slavery	eliminated	the	labor	constraints	that	limited	the	size	of	northern	farms	and	allowed	for	a	much	greater	concentration	of	wealth	(Wright	1970,	1978;	Ransom	1989).		As	Williamson	and	Cain	(2010)	put	it,	“The	total	estate	for	those	in	the	upper	tail	of	the	[wealth]	distribution	was	enormous.	It	should	be	emphasized,	however,	that	this	is	not	a	small	elite;	as	a	group,	slave	owners	were	sizeable	and	wealthy.”			Ransom	(1989,	63)	found	that	a	mere	two	percent	of	farmers	held	nearly	a	quarter	of	all	wealth	in	the	pre-Civil	War	South	and	that	these	wealthy	planter	elite	controlled	Southern	politics	before	and	after	the	war.			In	the	postwar	period,	there	is	evidence	that	land	ownership	remained	highly	concentrated.	Ransom	and	Sutch	(1977)	found	that	“a	small	elite	of	white	landowners	controlled	the	employment	opportunities	for	the	majority	of	black	workers”	(80).																																																									10	Comparing	monetary	values	across	time	is	complicated.		Perhaps	the	best	metric	by	which	to	evaluate	this	figure	is	as	a	share	of	GDP.	Using	this	criterion,	$122,250	in	1860	is	equivalent	to	$49.3	million	in	2016	(Williamson	2017).	
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Jonathan	Wiener	(1976)	found	that	the	top	5	percent	of	landowners	in	the	Alabama	and	Mississippi	black	belts	held	24	percent	improved	acreage,	26	percent	of	slaves,	26	percent	of	cotton	output,	and	30	percent	of	farm	value.		Shugg	(1937)	documented	the	expansion	of	the	plantation	system	in	Louisiana	after	the	Civil	War;	while	many	of	the	large	plantations	were	split	into	smaller	tenant	farms,	the	ownership	of	those	farms	often	remained	in	the	same	hands.	While	this	earlier	scholarship	has	provided	valuable	insights	into	the	nature	of	wealth	persistence,	there	are	aspects	of	this	question	that	can	only	be	adequately	addressed	with	the	broader	perspective	we	take	here.		We	know	that	wealth	remained	highly	concentrated	after	the	war	based	on	these	earlier	regional	studies,	but	we	know	little	about	the	pre-war	origins	of	the	postwar	planter	elite,	particularly	outside	of	the	regions	on	which	previous	scholarship	has	focused.		The	impact	of	slave	wealth	in	the	South	is	also	apparent	in	the	much	lower	share	of	real	property	in	total	wealth	compared	to	the	North.		In	the	North,	real	estate	was	the	principal	vehicle	of	wealth	accumulation,	accounting	for	two-thirds	or	more	of	property	ownership	among	the	top	45	percent	of	household	heads	who	reported	any	property	holding.		In	contrast,	personal	property	(which	included	slaves)	made	up	close	to	three-fifths	of	wealth	in	the	top	10	percent	of	the	Southern	wealth	distribution	and	was	still	about	half	of	total	property	wealth	for	those	between	the	55th	and	90th	percentiles.	
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Comparing	Table	2	with	Table	1,	it	is	evident	how	large	an	impact	the	Civil	War	and	emancipation	had	on	southern	wealth	holders.11		Given	the	prominent	role	of	slaves	among	the	property	of	the	wealthiest	southerners,	it	is	reasonable	to	conjecture	that	the	effects	of	emancipation	may	have	been	most	pronounced	at	the	top	of	the	wealth	distribution.12		While	northern	wealth	holders	above	the	55th	percentile	experienced	an	approximately	50	percent	increase	in	real	property	wealth	over	the	1860s,	the	value	of	property	owned	by	southerners	fell	by	nearly	75	percent.		The	drop	was	especially	pronounced	for	personal	property;	above	the	90th	percentile,	southern	wealth	holders	experienced	a	91	percent	drop	in	the	value	of	personal	property,	while	real	property	wealth	was	cut	by	more	than	half.			As	a	result,	after	the	war	the	relative	shares	of	real	and	personal	property	in	the	South	converged	toward	those	in	the	North,	with	real	property	making	up	60-70	percent	of	wealth,	at	least	among	the	wealthier	household	heads.		 Tables	1	and	2	also	reveal	a	number	of	other	notable	regional	differences	over	the	decade.		Women	made	up	a	relatively	small	share	of	household	heads	in	both	regions	and	in	both	census	years.		However,	women	represented	a	larger	fraction	of	wealth	holders	in	the	South	both	before	and	after	the	Civil	War,	and	there	was	a	noticeable	increase	in	the	female	share	of	heads	of	household	among	the	poorest																																																									11	It	is	worth	noting	that	the	war	itself	was	enormously	costly	for	the	nation	as	a	whole,	but	disproportionately	so	for	the	South.	Goldin	and	Lewis	(1975)	estimated	that	the	war	cost	$75	per	capita	for	the	North	and	$451	for	the	South.		12	The	elimination	of	slave	wealth	also	had	dramatic	implications	for	the	economic	institutions	that	emerged	during	Reconstruction.			Since	slaves	could	no	longer	be	used	as	collateral	to	secure	credit,	the	“pawn-shop	economy”	of	the	furnishing	merchants	stepped	into	the	breach	(Ransom	and	Sutch,	1977).		Moreover,	Wright	(1986)	argued	that	massive	shift	in	the	basis	of	southern	wealth	transformed	wealthy	southerners	from	“laborlords”	to	“landlords.”	
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households	after	the	war.		In	the	South	in	1860,	84.7	percent	of	households	below	the	55th	percentile	of	the	wealth	distribution	had	male	heads,	but	that	number	dropped	to	only	79.6	percent	in	the	1870	census.	We	suspect	this	is	driven	by	the	presence	of	war	widows	in	the	South,	where	an	estimated	13	percent	of	white	men	of	military	age	died	as	a	result	of	the	war	(Hacker	2011).13			
	 In	the	North,	the	likelihood	that	an	individual	was	living	outside	of	his	or	her	state	of	birth	diminished	as	wealth	levels	increased.		In	both	1860	and	1870,	close	to	two-thirds	of	northerners	below	the	55th	percentile	were	living	outside	their	state	of	birth,	a	proportion	that	fell	to	around	50	percent	at	the	top	of	the	wealth	distribution.		In	the	South,	geographic	mobility	was	markedly	lower	among	those	at	the	bottom	of	the	wealth	distribution,	and	there	is	no	clear	relationship	between	wealth	and	geographic	mobility.			The	proportion	of	high	wealth	household	heads	living	outside	their	state	of	birth	was	roughly	similar	to	that	for	lower	wealth	household	heads.		 In	both	regions,	rural	residents	outnumbered	urban	dwellers,	but	residence	patterns	looked	rather	different	across	wealth	strata.		In	the	North,	the	percent	urban	followed	an	inverted-U	pattern	in	both	1860	and	1870,	with	the	rural	shares	lowest	at	the	bottom	and	top	of	the	wealth	distribution.		As	Rosenbloom	and	Stutes	(2008)	noted	in	their	analysis	of	1870	wealth	data,	inequality	increased	with	urbanization.		There	was,	however,	a	noticeable	decline	in	rural	residents	over	the	course	of	the	decade	at	all	wealth	levels.		This	decline	was	especially	pronounced	among	the	wealthiest	1	percent	of	Northerners,	where	the	proportion	rural	fell	from	53.4	percent	to	39.2	percent	over	the	decade.			The	proportion	rural	was	consistently	higher	in	the	South,																																																									13	For	more	on	southern	war	widows,	see	Hacker	et	al	(2010)	and	Faust	(2004).	
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and	there	was	little	variation	across	the	wealth	distribution	in	1860.		By	1870,	perhaps	reflecting	the	beginnings	of	a	shift	away	from	agriculture	as	the	source	of	regional	wealth	in	the	South,	the	top	1	percent	of	southern	wealth	holders	were	much	more	likely	to	be	urban	residents	than	was	the	case	ten	years	earlier.		 The	bottom	rows	in	each	table	report	the	occupational	distribution	within	each	wealth	stratum	using	the	IPUMS	standardized	1950	occupational	codes.		Farmers	dominated	the	top	of	the	southern	wealth	distribution	in	both	1860	and	1870,	but	white-collar	jobs	were	much	more	important	at	the	top	of	the	northern	wealth	distribution.		There	were	some	notable	changes	in	occupational	composition	across	the	wealth	distribution	over	the	Civil	War	decade.		Most	notably,	and	consistent	with	the	rise	in	urbanization,	the	share	of	farmers	fell	while	the	numbers	of	professional	&	technical	and	clerical	&	managerial	occupations	rose.		The	cross-sectional	evidence	presented	so	far	is	sufficient	to	establish	that	there	were	important	regional	differences	in	wealth	holding,	and	that	the	Civil	War	and	emancipation	produced	large	shocks	to	wealth	holding,	especially	in	the	South.		They	cannot,	however,	reveal	what	happened	to	individuals	during	the	1860s.		Were	the	wealthiest	southerners	able	to	retain	their	relative	position	in	the	wealth	distribution	despite	the	absolute	loss	of	wealth	during	the	1860s?		Or	did	the	shock	of	the	war	and	emancipation	cause	those	at	the	top	to	fall	down	the	wealth	distribution	and	allow	those	further	down	to	rise	up?	As	our	earlier	review	of	the	literature	suggests,	answers	to	these	questions	have	varied	over	time	and	have	been	limited	in	their	generality	by	data	constraints.		Resolving	this	question	requires	following	the	fortunes	of	individuals	over	the	course	of	the	decade.		Past	efforts	to	do	this	have	focused	on	following	
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individuals	within	a	limited	area;	however,	as	we	describe	in	this	section,	we	are	now	able	to	construct	a	nationally	representative	linked	sample	that	is	not	constrained	to	the	geographically	immobile.	
	
3.	Creating	a	Linked	Sample			 Methods	of	record	linkage	across	multiple	censuses	are	now	well-established.		The	prevailing	approach,	which	has	evolved	from	that	pioneered	by	Ferrie	(1996),	proceeds	by	selecting	a	target	sample	in	one	census	year,	searching	by	name	(often	coded	phonetically)	in	the	other	census	for	potential	matches,	and	then	evaluating	these	matches	based	on	characteristics	such	as	birthplace	and	implied	birth	year,	calculated	as	census	year	minus	reported	age	(see	Massey	2016,	pp.	9-10).			If	more	than	one	potential	match	meeting	the	established	criteria	remains,	the	record	is	typically	dropped.		As	we	describe	below,	we	closely	follow	the	standard	approach,	but	with	a	few	modifications	dictated	by	the	characteristics	of	our	research	questions.	Since	we	are	interested	in	identifying	the	origins	of	top	wealth-holders	in	1870,	we	begin	with	a	sample	of	those	at	the	top	of	the	wealth	distribution	in	each	region	(North	and	South)	in	1870	and	seek	to	link	them	backward	to	records	in	the	1860	census.14		It	is	more	common	in	the	literature	to	link	individuals	forward	from	an	earlier	census	to	a	later	one,	but	a	number	of	prominent	studies	have	also	followed	a	
																																																								14	A	related	but	distinct	question	is	what	happened	to	top	wealth	holders	in	1860?		Answering	this	question	would	require	starting	with	a	sample	from	the	1860	census	and	seeking	to	link	individuals	forward	to	the	1870	census.		Such	an	approach	would	complement	the	results	reported	here,	and	is	part	of	our	larger	research	agenda,	but	resource	constraints	have	not	allowed	us	to	conduct	this	parallel	study.	
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backward	linkage	strategy	(see	Schaefer	1985;	Steckel	1990;	Galenson	1991,	and	Galenson	and	Pope	1992).15	There	are	advantages	and	disadvantages	to	both	forward	and	backward	linkage	strategies	(Ruggles	2008).		In	a	backward-linked	sample,	such	as	ours,	new	entrants	(immigrants	and	those	who	have	inherited	wealth)	will	lower	linkage	rates,	since	they	will	not	appear	in	the	earlier	census.		In	a	forward-linked	sample,	on	the	other	hand,	attrition	due	to	mortality	and	emigration	will	both	tend	to	lower	linkage	rates.16		Thus,	the	choice	of	linkage	strategy	is	largely	a	function	of	the	question	one	seeks	to	answer.	To	construct	our	linked	sample,	we	begin	by	identifying	household	heads	in	the	IPUMS	with	total	1870	property	holdings	that	placed	them	among	the	top	5	percent	in	their	region	of	residence.		For	1870,	the	IPUMS	has	collected	both	a	1	percent	random	sample	and	a	black	oversample,	referred	to	as	the	1.2	percent	sample.17		In	hopes	of	increasing	the	size	of	our	initial	sample	of	wealthy	individuals	we	used	the	1.2	percent	sample.	The	decision	to	restrict	the	sample	to	the	top	5	percent	reflects	an	effort	to	ensure	a	large	enough	sample	of	linked	individuals	for	regional	differences	to	be	
																																																								15	Some	of	these	papers	use	both	backward-	and	forward-linking	strategies.		Backward	linkages	have	sometimes	been	used	because	early	census	indexes	were	constructed	at	the	state	level,	and	it	was	necessary	to	use	state	of	birth	of	children	in	the	household	to	identify	the	state	index	to	be	searched	to	locate	the	household	at	an	earlier	date.	16	Using	contemporary	data	Massey	(2016)	shows	that	mortality	can	actually	increase	linkage	rates	by	reducing	the	pool	of	potential	matches	with	similar	names,	since	cases	where	two	or	more	potential	matches	are	often	discarded.		Bailey	et	al		(2017)	offer	additional	insight	about	the	effects	of	different	strategies	on	linkage	rates	in	historical	contexts.	17	For	1860	and	1870	the	IPUMS	1.2%	sample	includes	an	oversample	of	households	containing	one	or	more	blacks.			While	non-black	households	are	sampled	to	produce	a	1-in-100	sample	of	the	population,	households	with	black	members	were	sampled	at	a	rate	of	1-in-50.	
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visible,	while	keeping	the	data	collection	effort	manageable.	18		We	further	limit	our	sample	to	individuals	between	the	ages	of	25	and	75	in	1870.		The	lower	limit	helps	to	reduce	the	number	of	young	children	we	are	seeking	to	match	in	1860,	while	the	upper	limit	seeks	to	avoid	the	distorting	effect	of	wealth	transfers	in	old	age.	Most	of	the	literature	using	linked	samples	restricts	analysis	to	adult	males	to	avoid	the	difficulties	created	by	women	changing	their	name	at	marriage.		We	have	opted,	however,	to	include	female	household	heads	in	our	sample.		Close	to	7	percent	of	the	top	wealth	holders	in	1870	were	female	(see	Table	2),	a	fact	that	may	reflect	in	part	the	differential	mortality	caused	by	the	Civil	War.		Given	this	relatively	large	number	of	females,	we	prefer	to	include	them	despite	potential	linkage	challenges.	Because	we	are	linking	backward	and	are	able	to	search	the	entire	population	census	in	1860	(not	just	household	heads),	the	problem	of	linkage	is	reduced	to	some	degree	since	we	can	find	women	who	were	not	household	heads	in	1860.		In	practice,	linkage	rates	for	female	household	heads	(35	percent)	are	lower	than	for	males	(45	percent),	but	still	quite	acceptable.			If	we	are	able	to	locate	an	1870	female	household	head	in	1860,	we	assign	to	her	the	1860	wealth	of	the	head	of	the	household	in	which	she	resided,	on	the	assumption	that	by	1870	she	had	inherited	this	wealth	from	the	1860	head.	Such	an	approach	is	not	perfect—we	will,	for	example,	miss	women	who	married	
																																																								18	Because	we	must	hand	collect	the	matched	data	for	1870,	expanding	the	sample	is	relatively	costly.	Feigenbaum	(2015)	has	demonstrated	that	machine	learning	can	be	used	to	generate	matches	between	two	machine-readable	sets	of	data,	when	they	are	available.		However,	this	is	not	the	case	for	the	period	we	are	studying.		A	complete	count	census	is	available	for	1880,	but	this	census	did	not	collect	data	on	property	ownership,	and	is	temporally	removed	from	the	period	we	are	studying.		And	while	a	complete	count	census	is	available	for	1850,	names	are	available	only	for	only	a	subset	of	states.	
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or	remarried	after	1860—but	it	seems	superior	to	the	alternative	of	simply	ignoring	this	group	of	wealth	holders.		Like	women,	some	of	the	younger	1870	household	heads	will	be	members	of	other	households	in	1860.		Again,	however,	we	can	locate	them	in	1860,	and,	as	we	do	for	women,	we	assign	to	them	the	1860	wealth	of	the	head	of	the	household	in	which	they	resided.19	These	choices	generated	a	sample	of	3,944	top	wealth	household	heads	in	1870	(2,427	and	in	the	North	and	1,517	in	the	South)	to	be	linked	backward	to	the	1860	census.		We	then	searched	for	each	of	the	individuals	in	our	sample	in	the	1860	census	using	the	Ancestry.com	database	based	on	first	and	last	name,	and	year	of	birth	calculated	from	reported	age	in	1870.		Ancestry.com’s	search	engine	codes	names	phonetically	to	allow	for	variant	spellings	and	provides	a	list	of	individuals	ranked	by	the	quality	of	the	match	to	the	information	entered.	To	qualify	as	a	successful	link,	the	individual	located	in	the	1860	census	had	to	have	approximately	the	same	first	and	last	names	(using	the	Ancestry.com	algorithm)	and	an	implied	birth	year	(based	on	age	at	the	time	of	the	census)	within	2	years	plus	or	minus	that	recorded	in	1870.		In	cases	where	the	linkage	was	ambiguous	because	there	were	multiple	individuals	meeting	these	criteria,	we	used	place	of	birth	to	distinguish	between	the	potential	matches.		If,	at	this	point,	there	were	still	multiple	potential	matches	we	did	not	record	a	link.			For	each	linked	individual,	we	noted	several	aspects	of	link	quality,	including	whether	the	place	of	birth	was	the	same	in	both	censuses,	and	whether	we	were	able	to	identify	other	household	members	in	both	censuses.		We	did	not,	however,	use	
																																																								19	The	number	of	such	individuals	is	small,	however,	and	our	results	are	not	sensitive	to	this	choice.		
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information	about	other	household	members	to	determine	whether	a	link	was	valid	because	of	the	potential	sampling	bias	that	this	criterion	would	introduce.	The	results	of	our	search	are	summarized	in	Table	3.	We	were	successful	in	linking	1,763	individuals,	a	success	rate	of	44.7	percent.	Based	on	indicators	of	link	quality,	our	confidence	in	the	linkage	process	is	quite	high.		In	all	but	50	cases,	place	of	birth	was	identical	in	both	censuses,	and	in	85	percent	of	cases	we	were	able	to	find	other	household	members	(a	spouse	and/or	child)	that	matched	across	the	two	censuses.		Our	linkage	rate	appears	to	be	on	the	high	end	of	historical	studies	linking	across	nineteenth	century	census	records.		Ferrie	(1996),	for	example,	reports	a	success	rate	of	just	under	20	percent	when	linking	forward	from	the	1850	to	the	1860	census.	The	relatively	high	rate	of	success	in	linking	in	our	sample	may	reflect	our	focus	on	high	wealth	individuals.		It	seems	likely	that	such	individuals	would	be	more	likely	to	be	enumerated	and	to	provide	accurate	information	than	those	with	fewer	economic	resources.	Backward	linkage	also	eliminates	the	negative	effects	of	mortality	on	linkage.	20		This	is	especially	important	in	light	of	evidence	that	approximately	8	percent	of	white	males	between	ages	13	and	43	(in	1860)	died	in	the	war.21	Table	3	also	reports	a	number	of	characteristics	of	the	linked	and	unlinked	individuals.		The	final	three	columns	of	the	table	report	differences	in	mean	values	between	the	linked	and	unlinked	samples	and	their	significance	levels.	It	is	apparent	
																																																								20	Schaefer	(1985)	used	a	backward	linkage	approach	similar	to	ours	and	found	a	high	linkage	rate	of	approximately	50	percent	between	the	1860	and	1850	censuses.	21	The	estimated	death	rate	is	from	Vinovskis	(1989,	p.	38).	Previous	studies	(Wiener,	1976;	Campbell,	1982)	have	recognized	death	as	a	factor	in	non-persistence	and	typically	look	for	potential	heirs,	but	this	approach	is	obviously	limited	in	cases	where	there	were	no	surviving	heirs.	
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that	a	number	of	these	characteristics	differed	significantly	between	the	linked	and	unlinked	individuals.		Linked	individuals	were,	on	average,	4	years	older	than	those	we	failed	to	link.		This	may	be	because	of	the	difficulty	of	locating	records	for	younger	individuals	in	1860,	especially	if	they	were	living	in	households	headed	by	others.		Linked	individuals	also	reported	higher	values	of	both	real	and	personal	property,	were	less	likely	to	be	living	outside	their	state	of	birth,	and	less	likely	to	be	foreign	born.		In	addition,	there	was	a	strong	regional	differential	in	the	likelihood	of	linkage,	with	northerners	more	likely	to	be	linked	than	southerners.		In	contrast	to	the	association	of	a	number	of	personal	characteristics	with	the	likelihood	of	linkage,	the	overall	occupational	distributions	across	the	linked	and	unlinked	groups	was	quite	similar	although	linked	individuals	were	more	likely	to	be	farmers	and	somewhat	less	likely	to	be	in	clerical	and	managerial	occupations.			
4.	Assessing	Wealth	Mobility	in	the	1860s	The	decade	of	the	1860s	was	characterized	by	substantial	economic	disruptions	in	both	northern	and	southern	states.		In	the	South,	the	war	resulted	in	property	destruction	and	ended	with	the	emancipation	of	the	slave	population,	transferring	the	largest	component	of	southern	wealth	from	slave	owners	to	the	formerly	enslaved.			In	the	North,	the	interruption	of	cotton	shipments	affected	the	textile	industry,	while	the	demands	of	raising	and	supplying	the	Union	Army	created	opportunities	for	enterprising	businessmen.		How	did	these	events	affect	wealth	holders	in	both	regions?	Were	southern	wealth	holders	able	to	hold	onto	their	economic	power	despite	the	significant	reductions	in	their	total	wealth	caused	by	emancipation?		Or	did	
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the	disruptions	of	the	1860s	create	greater	opportunities	for	upward	(and	downward)	wealth	mobility?	As	we	have	noted,	during	the	1860s	average	wealth	levels	decreased	substantially	in	the	South,	but	increased	in	the	North.	Thus,	it	makes	the	most	sense	to	consider	the	question	of	wealth	stability	in	relative	terms	within	each	region.			Table	4	summarizes	information	about	transitions	in	wealth	strata	in	each	region	over	the	decade	of	the	1860s.		The	rows	of	each	table	indicate	location	in	the	1860	wealth	distribution,	while	columns	correspond	to	1870	wealth	levels.		To	locate	individuals	in	the	1860	wealth	distribution	we	have	used	percentile	cut-offs	for	total	property	ownership	in	the	individual’s	region	of	residence	calculated	from	the	IPUMS	1	percent	sample.		In	the	lower	panel	of	the	table,	we	report	the	value	of	each	cell	as	a	percentage	of	the	column	total.			Comparing	the	two	regions,	it	is	apparent	that	there	was	considerably	more	turnover	among	the	ranks	of	top	southern	wealth	holders	than	among	northern	wealth	holders.		While	more	than	40	percent	of	the	those	in	the	top	5	percent	of	northern	wealth	holders	had	been	in	the	top	5	percent	in	1860,	less	than	28	percent	of	top	southern	wealth	holders	in	1870	had	enjoyed	a	similar	status	in	1860.			Roughly	the	same	proportion	of	the	top	5	percent	in	each	region	(around	20	percent)	was	drawn	from	the	next	stratum	of	wealth	holders	in	1860	(90th	to	95th	percentile).		On	the	other	hand,	our	data	suggest	that	the	turmoil	of	the	Civil	War	decade	created	much	greater	opportunities	for	those	with	moderate	wealth	in	1860	–	between	the	55th	and	90th	percentiles	-	to	move	up	to	the	top	of	the	wealth	distribution.		Nearly	40	percent	of	the	wealthiest	southerners	in	1870	had	been	in	this	group	in	1860,	compared	to	less	than	
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one	quarter	of	the	richest	northerners.	Note	that	these	results	are	not	sensitive	to	variations	in	the	population	under	consideration.		As	illustrated	in	Figure	1,	restricting	the	population	to	males,	white	males	or	white	males	between	ages	35-65	in	1870	does	not	materially	affect	the	results.		It	also	seems	unlikely	that	these	results	could	be	explained	by	regional	differences	in	mortality	rates	among	top	wealth	holders.22	Although	not	directly	comparable	to	our	study,	Steckel	(1990,	p.	277)	found	that	46.2	percent	of	real	estate	wealth	holders	in	the	top	10	percent	in	1850	persisted	among	the	top	10	percent	of	1860	real	estate	wealth	holders.		Moreover,	he	reported	that	persistence	was	higher	among	these	top	wealth	holders	in	the	South	(53.2	percent)	than	in	the	North	(39.7	percent)	(p.	279).		Because	of	the	small	size	of	Steckel’s	sample	of	high	wealth	individuals	and	differences	in	sample	construction,	this	comparison	can	be	treated	at	best	as	suggestive,	but	if	these	results	hold	up	they	would	suggest	that	the	effects	of	Civil	War	and	emancipation	did	create	substantially	more	turnover	among	the	wealthiest	southerners.	One	motivation	for	examining	wealth	mobility	at	the	regional	level	is	the	concern	that	previous	studies	that	have	focused	on	the	county	level	may	be	distorted	by	the	effects	of	geographic	mobility.		Table	5,	which	summarizes	data	on	geographic	mobility	in	our	linked	sample	overall	and	by	region	of	residence	in	1870,	makes	clear	
																																																								22	If,	hypothetically,	the	Civil	War	resulted	in	a	higher	death	rate	among	top	southern	wealth	holders	in	1860,	this	would	open	up	more	spaces	at	the	top	in	1870	that	would	have	been	filled	by	upward	movement	from	those	lower	in	the	wealth	distribution	in	1860.		Assuming	that	the	true	rates	of	wealth	mobility	were	the	same	in	both	regions,	and	that	the	actual	decadal	death	rate	of	10.4%	for	40-year	while	old	males	between	1860	and	1870	(Carter	et	al,	Series	Ab	770-771)	applied	in	the	North,	the	death	rate	of	Southern	top	wealth	holders	would	have	had	to	have	been	over	40%	to	produce	the	observed	difference	in	regional	rates	of	wealth	mobility.	
	 24	
that	rates	of	geographic	mobility	were	relatively	high.		Close	to	25	percent	of	top	wealth	holders	changed	their	county	of	residence	over	the	decade	of	the	1860s.		Moreover,	rates	of	geographic	mobility	were	higher	in	the	South	(34.7	percent	of	top	wealth	holders	in	1870	had	changed	county	of	residence)	than	in	the	North	(only	20.3	percent	had	moved).			In	Table	6	we	examine	differences	in	wealth	mobility	of	movers	and	non-movers	separately.		The	top	panel	of	the	table	reports	regional	wealth	transition	data	comparable	to	Table	4,	but	calculated	only	for	those	who	changed	county	of	residence	during	the	decade.		The	bottom	panel	repeats	this	information	for	those	who	remained	in	their	1860	county	of	residence.		In	both	regions,	movers	were	less	likely	to	persist	among	the	top	wealth	holders.		Correspondingly,	there	was	a	much	greater	likelihood	that	geographic	mobility	was	combined	with	upward	wealth	mobility.		In	both	regions,	close	to	60	percent	of	“movers”	in	the	top	5	percent	of	wealth	holders	in	1870	had	moved	up	from	below	the	90th	percentile	in	1860,	many	of	them	from	the	bottom	55	percent	of	the	1860	wealth	distribution.			In	contrast,	wealth	persistence	was	higher	in	both	regions	for	the	geographically	immobile:	almost	half	of	“stayers”	in	the	North	retained	their	position	at	the	top	of	the	wealth	distribution	over	the	decade	of	the	1860s,	while	29.1	percent	of	southern	“stayers”	persisted	at	the	top.		The	regional	difference	in	persistence	at	the	top	would	still	be	present	in	a	study	limited	to	the	non-movers,	but	the	magnitude	of	the	regional	difference	would	be	understated	without	including	the	movers.	One	concern	in	interpreting	the	results	in	Table	4	is	that	they	may	be	influenced	by	differences	in	sample	composition	across	regions.		As	noted	earlier,	the	probability	
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of	linkage	varied	systematically	with	a	number	of	personal	characteristics,	and	it	is	possible	that	these	differences	affected	differences	in	measured	persistence.		To	test	the	effects	of	differences	in	linkage	probabilities	we	have	broken	our	linked	sample	into	24	demographic	groups	based	on	age,	nativity,	sex,	and	region	of	residence	and	used	the	probability	of	linkage	within	each	of	these	demographic	cells	to	reweight	the	linked	observations	so	that	they	reflect	the	composition	of	the	initial	sample	of	top	wealth	holders.23		The	results	of	this	calculation	are	reported	in	Table	7.		There	is	a	slight	narrowing	in	regional	differences	in	wealth	persistence,	but	like	Table	4,	Table	7	suggests	that	wealth	persistence	was	much	lower	in	the	South	than	in	the	North.24		
5.	Conclusion	For	the	United	States,	the	1860s	was	a	decade	of	pronounced	economic	turmoil	resulting	from	a	major	war	and	the	politically	imposed	end	of	slavery.		These	shocks	created	huge	economic	losses	in	the	South,	but	must	also	have	offered	opportunities	to	profit	in	the	region	for	those	adept	enough	to	respond	to	changing	conditions.		Similarly,	economic	shocks	to	the	northern	economy	should	have	created	
																																																								23	To	construct	these	demographic	cells	we	used	three	age	ranges—25	to	40,	40	to	55,	and	55	to	75	–	along	with	the	three	binary	demographic	characteristics	of	nativity,	region	of	residence	and	sex.		We	then	calculated	link	probabilities	and	used	the	inverse	of	the	probability	of	linkage	for	individuals	in	each	cell	to	calculate	weighted	wealth	transition	tables.	24	As	an	alternative	to	the	calculations	in	Table	7	we	have	also	estimated	probit	regressions	of	the	probability	of	remaining	in	the	top	5	percent	of	wealth	holders.		In	the	baseline	regression,	we	control	only	for	region	of	residence,	and	then	add	progressively	more	demographic	characteristics.		Consistent	with	the	results	reported	in	Table	7,	we	find	that	even	after	controlling	for	observable	demographic	characteristics	there	is	a	strong,	negative	and	statistically	significant	effect	of	living	in	the	South	on	persistence	in	the	top	wealth	group.	
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opportunities	to	profit.		In	the	aggregate,	the	events	of	the	1860s	resulted	in	substantial	declines	in	measured	wealth	in	the	South	and	large	increases	in	wealth	holding	in	the	North.			Views	about	how	this	turmoil	affected	those	at	the	top	of	the	southern	economy	have	differed.		Beginning	in	the	late	nineteenth-century,	historians	emphasized	the	turnover	in	southern	economic	elites,	arguing	that	the	Civil	War	wiped	out	the	planter	class	and	created	a	new	elite.		More	recently,	however,	scholarly	views	have	shifted,	arguing	that	persistence	rates	at	the	top	were	no	different	in	the	1860s	than	they	had	been	in	the	more	peaceful	1850s.			By	using	the	Ancestry.com	database	we	are	able	to	improve	on	past	efforts	to	link	wealthy	individuals	across	census	years.		Where	previous	studies	have	been	confined	to	a	few	counties,	we	are	able	to	study	a	random	sample	of	wealthy	individuals	in	all	locations	and	link	them	across	census	years	regardless	of	geographic	mobility.		Like	previous	scholars,	we	too	find	that	there	was	considerable	persistence	among	wealthy	southerners:	47	percent	of	those	in	the	top	5	percent	of	the	southern	wealth	distribution	in	1870	had	been	in	the	top	10	percent	of	the	distribution	in	1860.		But	the	rate	of	persistence	in	the	South	was	considerably	lower	than	it	was	in	the	North	over	the	decade	of	the	1860s.		In	the	North,	almost	62	percent	of	those	in	the	top	5	percent	of	wealth	holders	in	1870	had	begun	the	decade	in	the	top	10	percent.		Thus,	while	wealth	provided	insulation	from	the	shocks	of	the	1860s,	it	was	a	less	effective	insulator	in	the	South	than	in	the	North.		 These	results	also	shed	some	light	on	post-war	economic	development	in	the	South.		For	instance,	even	as	stark	wealth	inequality	persisted	into	the	reconstruction	period	and	the	hierarchical	structure	of	the	pre-war	Southern	economy,	the	greater	
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turnover	we	observe	there	indicates	that	the	wealthiest	landlords	of	the	postwar	era	were	often	different	individuals	than	the	laborlords	of	the	late	antebellum	period.			 For	those	interested	in	the	impact	of	the	Civil	War	and	emancipation	on	the	economic	development	of	the	postbellum	South,	the	results	reported	here	require	some	revision	of	widely	accepted	views.		While	there	was	undoubtedly	an	entrenched	southern	elite	that	held	onto	economic	status	and	power,	it	also	appears	that	the	1860s	introduced	considerably	greater	levels	of	turnover	in	the	South	than	in	other	parts	of	the	United	States.		Collection	of	additional	data	will	be	required	to	determine	whether	these	regional	differences	existed	in	the	1850s	as	well,	or	if	the	Civil	War	was	the	cause	of	this	difference.				 More	generally,	our	findings	that	the	Civil	War	led	to	higher	rates	of	wealth	mobility	in	the	South	have	salience	for	discussions	of	the	dynamics	of	wealth	and	income	inequality.	Prompted	in	part	by	the	well-publicized	work	of	Thomas	Piketty	(2014),	economists	have	recently	shown	a	renewed	interest	in	this	topic.		Piketty	has	argued	that	capitalist	economies	are	characterized	by	long-run	tendencies	toward	increasing	concentration	of	wealth	and	income,	but	that	in	the	twentieth	century	the	forces	of	concentration	were	significantly	obscured	by	the	massive	disruptions	caused	by	the	two	World	Wars	and	the	Great	Depression.			A	number	of	other	studies	have	explored	the	long-run	persistence	of	social	and	economic	status.		Clark	(2014)	makes	use	of	differences	in	the	frequency	of	family	names	among	elite	groups	to	argue	that	social	status	is	highly	persistent	over	long	time	periods.		Long	and	Ferrie	(2013),	using	linked	census	data	for	the	Unites	States	to	trace	patterns	of	occupational	mobility,	concluded	that	rates	of	mobility	have	declined	since	the	nineteenth	century.		But	less	
	 28	
attention	has	been	devoted	to	the	way	in	which	economic	and	political	shocks	may	affect	the	persistence	of	social	status.			The	evidence	presented	here	adds	support	for	the	view	that	major	political	shocks	can	disrupt	the	normal	accumulation	of	assets	and	cause	greater	wealth	mobility,	at	least	among	those	on	the	losing	end	of	these	shocks.				
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Table	1:	1860	Characteristics	of	Northerners	and	Southerners,	by	percentile	
	
		Sources	and	Notes:		The	data	are	from	the	Integrated	Public	Use	Microdata	Series	(IPUMS)	1-in-100	random	sample	of	the	Census	(Ruggles	2015).		The	North	includes	states	in	the	Northeast	and	North	Central	Census	division,	while	the	South	includes	states	in	the	South	Atlantic	and	South	Central	Census	divisions.				
Below&55th 55th 90th 95th 99th& Below&55th 55th 90th 95th 99th&
Number'of'Observations 18,764 12,379 1,782 1,378 356 6,631 4,221 599 487 121
Real'Property'Wealth'(Median,'$) 0 1,600 6,000 10,000 27,860 0 1,500 6,250 12,800 50,000
Personal'Property'Wealth'(Median,'$) 100 500 1,205 2,612 10,812 100 1,200 11,305 25,000 70,000
Total'Property'Wealth'(Median,'$) 100 2,200 7,327 13,000 40,000 150 3,100 17,800 38,000 122,250
Real'as'Pct'of'Total'Property'Wealth 28.4% 71.6% 76.3% 71.9% 67.6% 23.4% 52.1% 40.5% 38.0% 44.9%
Male 89.2% 93.9% 94.9% 94.2% 93.3% 84.7% 89.9% 90.8% 90.1% 94.2%
Rural'Resident 65.1% 84.7% 85.6% 76.2% 53.4% 82.1% 92.2% 90.3% 88.9% 85.1%
Foreign'Born 41.4% 20.2% 11.3% 10.7% 16.3% 14.3% 6.0% 4.8% 3.7% 5.8%
Living'Outside'Birthstate 68.5% 58.6% 48.8% 50.6% 55.9% 48.7% 49.8% 45.2% 50.5% 50.4%
White 98.2% 99.7% 99.9% 99.8% 100.0% 94.4% 99.4% 99.8% 99.6% 99.2%
Age'(Median) 37 43 46 48 49 38 42 46 48 48
Professional'&'Technical 2.1% 3.1% 2.9% 7.0% 7.6% 1.7% 4.3% 9.0% 8.6% 3.3%
Farming 22.4% 61.8% 68.5% 55.9% 30.3% 39.1% 69.5% 68.6% 70.6% 76.9%
Clerical&Managerial 4.4% 7.7% 11.8% 19.7% 35.4% 3.0% 6.8% 11.4% 12.7% 14.0%
Sales 1.6% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 2.2% 1.0% 0.7% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0%
Craftsmen 21.7% 12.4% 6.2% 4.9% 6.2% 16.3% 7.7% 3.0% 1.8% 1.7%
Operatives'&'Kindred'workers 11.0% 5.0% 2.6% 3.6% 3.7% 6.4% 2.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.0%
Service'workers 2.4% 0.5% 0.2% 0.6% 0.0% 2.9% 0.9% 1.0% 0.4% 0.0%
Laborers 23.4% 2.8% 1.1% 0.8% 0.8% 18.0% 1.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.0%
NonWOccupational 11.0% 6.0% 6.0% 7.0% 13.8% 11.7% 6.8% 5.3% 4.9% 4.1%
North South
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Table	2:		1870	Characteristics	of	Northerners	and	Southerners,	by	percentile	
		Sources	and	Notes:		See	Table	1.						
Below&55th 55th 90th 95th 99th& Below&55th 55th 90th 95th 99th&
Number'of'Observations 25,261 15,992 2,429 1,810 492 11,099 7,718 1,049 833 217
Real'Property'Wealth'(Median,'$) 0 2,400 8,000 15,000 40,000 0 380 3,000 7,300 25,000
Personal'Property'Wealth'(Median,'$) 100 650 2,000 3,500 20,000 0 300 1,000 2,000 6,442
Total'Property'Wealth'(Median,'$) 175 3,100 10,500 19,000 60,000 0 725 4,152 9,900 31,333
Real'as'Pct'of'Total'Property'Wealth 34.4% 73.1% 75.9% 73.3% 63.8% 8.7% 45.6% 69.4% 73.6% 72.4%
Male 88.1% 92.7% 94.9% 94.4% 92.3% 79.6% 89.1% 91.9% 90.6% 90.8%
Rural'Resident 60.6% 79.6% 79.7% 67.0% 39.2% 85.2% 90.7% 85.3% 83.9% 67.7%
Foreign'Born 40.8% 28.6% 19.3% 17.2% 17.3% 6.5% 7.5% 12.1% 10.3% 11.5%
Living'Outside'Birthstate 67.9% 62.5% 55.8% 51.1% 51.4% 39.3% 46.5% 43.9% 40.8% 47.9%
White 97.1% 99.6% 99.9% 99.9% 99.8% 40.9% 89.8% 99.3% 99.5% 99.5%
Age'(Median) 39 45 48 49 50 40 42 46 48 50
Professional'&'Technical 2.1% 2.5% 3.7% 6.1% 7.3% 1.0% 3.0% 6.5% 8.2% 8.8%
Farming 20.5% 56.5% 62.2% 50.6% 17.9% 20.3% 62.6% 61.8% 56.1% 48.8%
Clerical&Managerial 5.1% 8.4% 14.0% 21.7% 43.7% 1.6% 4.3% 13.3% 18.0% 24.9%
Sales 1.8% 1.3% 1.2% 1.4% 2.6% 0.6% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.5%
Craftsmen 18.6% 12.4% 6.1% 5.0% 5.1% 7.3% 7.9% 5.5% 5.0% 4.1%
Operatives'&'Kindred'workers 14.4% 5.8% 2.6% 3.1% 3.0% 4.0% 3.1% 2.0% 1.0% 1.4%
Service'workers 2.2% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 3.8% 0.9% 0.6% 0.5% 0.0%
Laborers 23.5% 4.1% 1.3% 0.9% 0.6% 45.9% 8.0% 0.9% 0.5% 0.0%
NonWOccupational 11.8% 8.3% 8.4% 10.8% 19.3% 15.5% 9.6% 9.1% 10.2% 11.5%
North South
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Table	3:		Characteristics	of	Linked	Sample		
		Sources	and	Notes:		Household	heads	with	total	property	wealth	placing	them	in	the	top	5	percent	of	the	wealth	distribution	and	between	ages	25	and	75	were	identified	in	the	1870	IPUMS.		This	generates	a	sample	of	3,944	individuals	(2,427	in	the	North	and	1,517	in	the	South)	who	were	then	linked	to	the	1860	census	using	Ancestry.com.			
	
Name%and + +
No%Link Age Birthplace %HH%Member
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number%of%Observations 2,181 1,763 1,713 1,492
Individual%&%Household%Characteristics:
%%Age 47.7 51.6 51.6 52.7 O4.0 O11.16 0.000
%%Nonwhite 0.7% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.5% 2.36 0.019
%%North 54.1% 70.7% 70.6% 70.6% O16.6% O10.93 0.000
%%Urban%Resident 67.2% 69.1% 69.2% 69.8% O1.9% O1.29 0.196
%%Male 91.4% 94.2% 94.4% 95.0% O2.8% O3.41 0.001
%%Foreign%Born 16.9% 10.8% 11.0% 11.3% 6.0% 5.53 0.000
%%Has%a%Spouse%in%1870 81.4% 87.7% 88.0% 89.5% O6.3% O5.48 0.000
%%Has%a%Child/Children%in%1870 93.0% 97.2% 97.3% 98.4% O4.2% O6.30 0.000
%%Living%Outside%State%of%Birth 50.1% 44.3% 44.5% 44.9% 5.8% 3.64 0.000
Wealth%Levels:
%%Value%of%Real%Property $18,441 $22,489 $22,296 $22,349 O$4,048 O3.89 0.000
%%Value%of%Personal%Property $8,822 $11,486 $11,160 $10,492 O$2,664 O2.70 0.007
Occupations:
%%Professional%&%Technical 7.1% 7.7% 7.8% 7.3% O0.6% O0.71 0.477
%%Farming 45.6% 49.6% 49.6% 51.5% O4.0% O2.50 0.012
%%Clerical%&%Managerial 25.3% 22.5% 22.4% 21.4% 2.8% 2.09 0.037
%%Sales 1.1% 1.5% 1.5% 1.4% O0.4% O1.03 0.304
%%Craftsmen 4.5% 4.9% 4.8% 5.2% O0.4% O0.57 0.571
%%Operatives%&%Kindred%workers 2.2% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% O0.3% O0.61 0.545
%%Service%workers 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.2% 1.04 0.297
%%Laborers 0.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 1.22 0.222
%%NonOOccupational 13.0% 10.7% 10.7% 9.9% 2.3% 2.23 0.026
Linked%observations%based%on Difference%in%means
Difference tOstat p%value
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Table	4:		Transition	Matrix	Between	1860	and	1870	Wealth	Centile	Groups		
		Sources	and	Notes:		The	rows	of	each	table	indicate	location	in	the	1860	wealth	distribution,	while	columns	correspond	to	1870	wealth	levels.		To	locate	individuals	in	the	1860	wealth	distribution	we	have	used	percentile	cut-offs	for	total	property	ownership	in	the	individual’s	region	of	residence	calculated	from	the	IPUMS	1	percent	sample.		In	the	lower	panel	of	the	table,	we	report	the	value	of		each	cell	as	a	percentage	of	the	column	total.									
Top$95'99% Top$1$% Row$total Top$95'99% Top$1$% Row$Total
Bottom$55% 62 8 70 Bottom$55% 146 36 182
55'90% 187 17 204 55'90% 252 43 295
90'95% 78 21 99 90'95% 229 18 247
95'99% 67 35 102 95'99% 295 78 373
Top$1% 16 25 41 Top$1% 48 102 150
Col$Total 410 106 516 Col$Total 970 277 1247
Column$
Percentages
Top$95'99% Top$1$% Row$total Top$95'99% Top$1$% Row$total
Bottom$55% 15.1% 7.5% 13.6% Bottom$55% 15.1% 13.0% 14.6%
55'90% 45.6% 16.0% 39.5% 55'90% 26.0% 15.5% 23.7%
90'95% 19.0% 19.8% 19.2% 90'95% 23.6% 6.5% 19.8%
95'99% 16.3% 33.0% 19.8% 95'99% 30.4% 28.2% 29.9%
Top$1% 3.9% 23.6% 7.9% Top$1% 4.9% 36.8% 12.0%
South,'1870'Wealth'Distribution North,'1870'Wealth'Distribution
Po
sit
io
n$
in
$th
e$
18
60
$W
ea
lth
$D
ist
rib
ut
io
n
	 36	
Figure	1:		Robustness	Checks	for	Transition	Matrix	
	
		 Panel	A:		South	 	 	 	 	 	
	
	Notes:	Shows	the	fractions	of	Southern	households	in	various	1860	wealth	strata	(along	the	horizontal	axis)	that	moved	into	the	top	five	percent	of	wealth	holders	in	1870	(measured	on	the	vertical	axis)	using	various	restrictions	on	the	population.	
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Panel	B:	North	
	
	
	Notes:	Shows	the	fractions	of	Northern	households	in	various	1860	wealth	strata	(along	the	horizontal	axis)	that	moved	into	the	top	five	percent	of	wealth	holders	in	1870	(measured	on	the	vertical	axis)	using	various	restrictions	on	the	population.	
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Table	5:		Geographic	Mobility,	1860-1870	
		
		Notes:	See	Table	3	Sources	and	Notes	for	the	underlying	dataset	from	which	mobility	status	was	calculated.														
1860-1870 Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
Same 
county 1,331 75.5% 994 79.7% 337 65.3%
Different 
County, 
Same 
State 235 13.3% 131 10.5% 104 20.2%
Different 
State 197 11.2% 122 9.8% 75 14.5%
Column Total 1,763 1,247 516
All Observations North South
Mobility 
Status
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Table	6:		Transition	Matrix	Between	1860	and	1870,	by	Mobility	Status			
			Notes:		The	top	panel	reports	regional	wealth	transition	data	comparable	to	Table	4,	but	calculated	only	for	those	who	changed	county		of	residence	during	the	decade.		The	bottom	panel	repeats	this	information	for	those	who	remained	in	their	1860	county	of	residence.									
95-99% 100% Total 95-99% 100% Total 95-99% 100% Total 95-99% 100% Total
Bottom 55% 40 4 44 29.4% 9.3% 24.6% Bottom 55% 65 21 86 33.9% 34.4% 34.0%
55-90% 61 5 66 44.9% 11.6% 36.9% 55-90% 66 13 79 34.4% 21.3% 31.2%
90-95% 15 9 24 11.0% 20.9% 13.4% 90-95% 28 2 30 14.6% 3.3% 11.9%
95-99% 16 15 31 11.8% 34.9% 17.3% 95-99% 25 10 35 13.0% 16.4% 13.8%
100 4 10 14 2.9% 23.3% 7.8% 100 8 15 23 4.2% 24.6% 9.1%
Total 136 43 179 Total 192 61 253
95-99% 100% Total 95-99% 100% Total 95-99% 100% Total 95-99% 100% Total
Bottom 55% 22 4 26 8.0% 6.3% 7.7% Bottom 55% 81 15 96 10.4% 6.9% 9.7%
55-90% 126 12 138 46.0% 19.0% 40.9% 55-90% 186 30 216 23.9% 13.9% 21.7%
90-95% 63 12 75 23.0% 19.0% 22.3% 90-95% 201 16 217 25.8% 7.4% 21.8%
95-99% 51 20 71 18.6% 31.7% 21.1% 95-99% 270 68 338 34.7% 31.5% 34.0%
100 12 15 27 4.4% 23.8% 8.0% 100 40 87 127 5.1% 40.3% 12.8%
Total 274 63 337 Total 778 216 994
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Table	7:		Wealth	Transitions	with	Weighted	Observations		
			Notes:		These	calculations	are	based	on	three	age	ranges—25	to	40,	40	to	55,	and	55	to	75	–	along	with	the	three	binary	demographic	characteristics	of	nativity,	region	of	residence	and	sex.		The	weights	used	to	calculate	the	weighted	wealth	transition	tables	are	the	inverse	of	the	linkage	probability	for	individuals	in	each	cell.		
Top$95'
99% Top$1$%
Row$
total
Top$95'
99%
Top$1$
%
Row$
total
Top$95'
99%
Top$1$
%
Row$
total
Top$95'
99%
Top$1$
%
Row$
total
Bottom$55% 209 25 234 17.3% 8.2% 15.4% Bottom$55% 341 82 422 18.0% 15.5% 17.4%
55'90% 554 58 613 45.8% 19.2% 40.4% 55'90% 511 92 603 27.0% 17.5% 24.9%
90'95% 217 59 276 17.9% 19.5% 18.2% 90'95% 421 35 457 22.2% 6.8% 18.9%
95'99% 186 98 285 15.4% 32.4% 18.8% 95'99% 530 139 669 27.9% 26.5% 27.6%
Top$1% 45 63 108 3.7% 20.8% 7.1% Top$1% 92 177 269 4.9% 33.7% 11.1%
Col$Total 1,211 304 1,515 Col$Total 1,896 525 2,421
Frequencies Column$Percentages
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